Illegality and Italy's new government by Capussela, Andrea
Illegality	and	Italy’s	new	government
The	coalition	that	has	just	taken	office	in	Rome	did	not	begin	well.	But	as	Andrea	Capussela	writes,
among	its	proposals	is	a	plan	to	strengthen	the	rule	of	law,	which	could	improve	Italy’s	unfair	and
inefficient	system.	Its	opponents	lie	not	only	among	the	country’s	establishment,	however:	tension	also
exists	within	the	coalition	between	the	Five	Star	Movement	and	the	League.	These	obstacles	can	only
be	overcome	through	an	open	political	battle,	which	could	lead	the	coalition	to	a	more	productive	path.
Giuseppe	Conte	with	the	new	Italian	government	on	1	June,	Credit:	Presidenza	della	Repubblica	(Public	Domain)
One	trait	that	distinguishes	Italy	from	her	Western	peers	is	the	gravity	and	coexistence	of	corruption,	tax	evasion,	and
organised	crime.	One	encouraging	trait	of	the	new	governing	coalition,	among	many	concerning	ones,	is	its	pledge	to
fight	those	criminal	phenomena.	But	one	member	of	it,	the	League,	was	often	involved	in	corruption	scandals,	has
governed	for	nine	years	under	the	leadership	of	a	convicted	tax	evader,	Silvio	Berlusconi,	and	has	generally	been
tolerant	with	white-collar	crime.
Damaging	though	they	are,	those	criminal	phenomena	are	not	the	sole	or	even	the	main	causes	of	Italy’s	worrying
decline.	In	a	book	on	this	subject,	I	argue	that	they	are	components	of	the	country’s	politico-economic	equilibrium,
whose	logic	is	the	primary	cause	of	low	growth	and	political	discontent.	Besides	its	immediate	effects,	therefore,
achieving	a	perceptible	reduction	of	illegality	would	both	attest	and	strengthen	the	country’s	capacity	to	shift	herself
onto	a	fairer	and	more	efficient	equilibrium.
A	legislative	policy	that	weakened	the	rule	of	law
Corruption	and	tax	evasion	have	been	systemic	problems	for	decades.	In	1992-94,	the	political	parties	that	had	ruled
Italy	since	1948	were	swept	away	by	popular	anger	at	the	pervasive	bribery	unveiled	by	the	so-called	‘Clean	Hands’
judicial	investigations.	But	the	centre-right	and	centre-left	coalitions	that	succeeded	them	were	equally	tainted	by
corruption,	albeit	to	a	different	degree.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	they	effectively	sought	to	prevent	a	repeat	of	those
investigations	by	passing	a	line	of	laws	aimed	at	obstructing,	not	strengthening,	the	repression	of	white-collar	crime
(see,	e.g.,	an	earlier	post	on	this	blog).
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Although	respectable	arguments	were	also	used	to	defend	this	legislative	policy,	such	as	the	autonomy	of	politics
from	the	judiciary,	the	post-1994	political	establishment	undercut	them	by	failing	to	clean	its	own	house.	To	quote	but
one	recent	example,	on	16	March	2017	a	bipartisan	senate	majority	refused	to	expel	from	its	ranks,	as	the	law
required,	a	senator	convicted	–	by	an	irrevocable	third-instance	judgment	issued	by	the	supreme	court	–	of
embezzlement	of	public	funds.	This	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	the	high	level	of	political	distrust	as	well	as
the	popularity	of	the	Five	Star	Movement,	whose	foundational	message	was	precisely	a	call	for	greater	public
integrity.
Criticism	of	the	new	coalition’s	anti-corruption	proposals
This	part	of	the	programme	elicited	sceptical	reactions	not	just	in	centrist	and	centre-right	circles,	those	traditionally
most	closely	associated	with	bribery	and	tax	evasion,	but	also	among	centre-left	ones.	In	part,	the	criticism	is
persuasive.	For	instance,	the	proposal	to	use	US-style	integrity	tests	–	namely,	having	policemen	disguised	as
businessmen	offering	bribes	to	public	officials,	to	test	their	loyalty	to	the	public	good	and	punish	those	who	accept	–
is	certainly	problematic.
More	importantly,	the	coalition’s	overall	approach	suggests	an	excessive	reliance	on	prison	sentences,	which	ignores
the	deplorable	conditions	of	some	of	Italy’s	prisons	and	neglects	the	questions	that	anyway	exist	on	the	effectiveness
of	imprisonment	as	a	means	to	prevent	crime	and	re-educate	criminals	(both	arguments	which	do	not	concern	only
white-collar	crime,	naturally,	but	ought	to	stimulate	a	wider	debate	on	criminal	justice).	Stiffer	financial	penalties	and
tougher	rules	on	the	confiscation	of	ill-gotten	or	unexplained	assets	would	seem	a	better	policy.
Other	critiques	are	less	well	founded.	One	example	is	the	claim	that	the	coalition’s	plan	to	encourage	whistleblowing
is	comparable	to	an	autocracy’s	requirement	that	citizens	inform	against	each	other.	But	even	those	more	reasonable
reservations	are	often	used	as	a	lever	to	usher	in	a	sweeping	critique	of	the	whole	part	of	the	programme	devoted	to
the	rule	of	law,	which	seems	to	target	the	very	intention	of	fighting	white-collar	crime	with	greater	determination	than
in	the	past.
The	background:	tax	evasion	and	corruption
Little	data	is	needed	to	set	this	criticism	against	its	proper	background.	The	total	amount	of	taxes	that	are	evaded
each	year	is	now	estimated	at	between	7	and	8	per	cent	of	GDP.	This	is	equivalent	to	about	one	sixth	of	actual
government	revenue,	a	level	considerably	higher	than	in	Italy’s	peers.	Within	that	larger	aggregate,	VAT,	which	has	a
uniform	EU-wide	regime,	allows	a	narrower	but	fairly	reliable	cross-country	comparison:	according	to	the	latest
estimate,	in	Italy	unpaid	VAT	is	28	per	cent	of	theoretical	revenue,	a	level	twice	the	EU	average	and	between	two
and	three	times	higher	than	in	Britain	(10),	France	(14),	Germany	(10),	and	Spain	(9).
Turning	to	corruption,	all	available	indicators	place	Italy	much	closer	to	the	average	Balkan	country	than	to	her	peers
(see,	e.g.,	figure	9	of	this	post	on	this	blog).	And,	to	quote	but	one	pointer	to	the	scale	of	the	direct	costs,	the
European	Commission	recently	remarked	that	over	the	past	two	decades	in	Italy	the	per-kilometre	construction	cost
of	high-speed	railway	tracks	was	–	at	constant	prices	–	between	four	and	ten	times	higher	than	in	either	France,
Japan,	or	Spain.
One	important	reason	why	white-collar	crime	is	so	widespread	is	that	it	is	rarely	punished.	A	comparison	with	one	of
the	world’s	least	corrupt	countries,	Finland,	will	suffice.	Council	of	Europe	data	show	that	in	2015	the	number	of
people	serving	a	prison	sentence	for	white	collar	crimes	was	about	six	times	greater	in	Finland	than	in	Italy,	in	per
capita	terms,	and	that,	inversely,	the	share	of	the	total	population	serving	a	prison	sentence	(for	any	crime)	was	20
per	cent	greater	in	Italy	than	in	Finland.	This	suggests	that	Italy’s	law-enforcement	system	is	not	comparatively
lenient,	but	is	particularly	tolerant	with	white-collar	crime:	about	seven	times	more	tolerant	than	Finland’s.
One	important	reason	for	this	is	the	legislative	policy	I	mentioned	earlier.	And	although	no	equally	egregious	misuse
of	the	legislative	function	was	observed	during	the	past	parliament,	tolerance	for	illegality	nonetheless	persisted.	In
December	2015,	for	instance,	the	(centre-left)	government	trebled	–	from	1,000	to	3,000	euros	–	the	threshold	within
which	cash	payments	are	permissible.	This	choice,	which	reversed	a	policy	of	the	2011-13	technocratic	government,
is	less	anodyne	than	it	might	seem.	As	Kenneth	Rogoff	has	persuasively	argued,	in	fact,	limiting	the	use	of	cash	can
be	an	effective	measure	against	tax	and	regulatory	evasion:	indeed,	that	same	year	France,	where	the	shadow
economy	is	less	than	half	the	size	it	is	in	Italy	as	a	share	of	GDP,	lowered	that	same	threshold	from	3,000	to	1,000
euros.
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Public	debate	and	credibility
Reasoned	debate	may	therefore	allow	Italian	public	opinion	to	distinguish	between	the	reasonable	reservations
raised	against	the	coalition’s	rule-of-law	programme,	and	those	critiques	that	conversely	disguise	a	defence	of	the
status	quo	I	just	sketched.	For	the	same	reason,	the	coalition	would	have	every	interest	in	stimulating	such	a	debate
and	imposing	that	programme	on	the	nation’s	agenda.
I	mentioned	the	League’s	tolerance	for	white-collar	crime,	however.	Admittedly,	this	position	was	more	closely
associated	with	the	party’s	previous	leaderships.	But	the	coalition’s	contract	does	contain	a	revealing	sign	of
continuity,	because	it	reproduces	the	League’s	electoral	pledge	of	a	one-off	measure	of	‘fiscal	peace’.	This	is	an
amnesty	for	tax	evasion,	in	fact,	which	the	League	linked	to	its	flat-tax	proposal,	which	was	in	turn	justified	also	with
the	argument	that	it	will	improve	tax	compliance.	Even	leaving	the	merits	and	the	very	feasibility	of	that	proposal
aside,	the	argument	is	very	dubious.	It	seems	more	likely	that	a	fresh	amnesty	will,	just	like	the	country’s	many	past
ones,	raise	the	incentives	to	evade	taxes.	Especially	if	it	will	be	accompanied	by	the	lifting	of	any	restriction	on	the
use	of	cash,	as	the	League’s	leader	has	proposed	in	one	of	his	first	speeches	after	taking	up	the	function	of	interior
minister.
Enacting	such	measures	is	also	highly	likely	to	undermine	the	coalition’s	proposed	anti-corruption	measures.	For
their	effects	largely	depend	on	changing	firms’	and	citizens’	expectations	on	how	the	state	will	enforce	those
measures	and	how	their	own	peers	will	react	to	them,	and	they	will	eschew	corruption	in	appreciable	numbers	only	if
the	state’s	determination	to	fight	it	is	judged	credible:	but	a	state	whose	first	act	in	the	fight	against	white-collar	crime
is	a	tax	amnesty	is	hardly	credible.	In	other	words,	the	tension	between	the	defence	of	the	status	quo	and	the
aspiration	to	change	it,	which	traverses	both	society	and,	apparently,	also	the	coalition,	could	sink	this	part	of	its
programme.
A	political	battle:	imposing	the	rule	of	law	on	the	national	agenda
Only	an	open	political	battle,	fought	before	public	opinion,	can	solve	that	tension	credibly.	And,	at	present,	only	the
Five	Star	Movement	can	take	up	the	flag	of	the	rule	of	law	and	begin	such	a	battle.	But	although	such	a	move	would
flow	directly	from	its	foundational	message,	and	would	be	certain	to	receive	wide	support	among	civil	society,	it	is
unclear	whether	the	party	has	the	ideas,	the	organisation,	and	even	the	will	to	wage	that	battle.
First,	the	party	has	obvious	weaknesses.	It	lacks	a	recognisable	political	culture	and	a	meaningful	political	selection
system,	in	particular,	and	internal	debate	and	democracy	both	seem	very	constrained.	One	consequence	is	that	its
strategy	will	be	decided,	in	relative	isolation,	by	a	largely	unaccountable	leadership,	whose	competence	and
convictions	are	effectively	untested.
Second,	having	acceded	to	national	office,	the	party	also	appeared	tactically	inept.	Despite	being	the	coalition’s
senior	partner,	in	fact,	it	was	thoroughly	side-lined	by	the	League’s	activism,	not	just	on	migration	policy.	By	opening
a	battle	on	the	rule	of	law	the	Five	Star	Movement	could	regain	the	initiative,	therefore,	and	push	the	League	into	the
position	of	the	defender	of	the	status	quo.	For	the	same	reasons,	however,	such	an	initiative	could	break	up	the
coalition:	and	it	is	unclear	whether	in	the	eyes	of	the	party’s	leadership	the	rule	of	law	is	a	higher	priority	than
retaining	power.
Finally,	the	Five	Star	Movement	is	not	untainted.	It	was	involved	in	some	corruption	scandals:	in	Rome,	most	notably,
which	it	has	governed	since	2016.	And	although	this	did	not	dent	its	emphasis	on	the	rule	of	law,	its	response	to	the
investigations	–	especially	the	latest	ones	in	Rome	–	was	not	without	ambiguity.
Should	the	Five	Star	Movement	open	that	battle,	those	who	desire	Italy	to	shift	toward	a	fairer	and	more	efficient
equilibrium	might	consider	supporting	it.	For	all	this	party’s	shortcomings,	if	its	apparent	determination	to	fight	white-
collar	crime	prevails	against	its	own	partisan	interests,	the	League’s	likely	obstruction,	and	the	political
establishment’s	critiques,	two	important	consequences	could	follow:	a	potentially	serious	attempt	to	strengthen	the
rule	of	law	would	begin,	which	the	country	has	needed	for	at	least	three	decades,	and	this	priority	could	also
gradually	impose	itself	on	the	rest	of	the	political	spectrum.
The	legislative	policy	I	mentioned	earlier	was	only	possible,	for	example,	because	the	rule	of	law	effectively	lacked	a
constituency	in	parliament.	This	would	change	if	the	Five	Star	Movement	won	that	battle,	thanks	to	the	broad	popular
support	that	it	is	certain	to	elicit,	and	thereby	forced	the	rest	of	the	political	spectrum	to	bow	to	that	priority.
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Should	the	party	duck	that	battle,	conversely,	the	vast	political	space	that	the	collapse	of	Italy’s	establishment	had
opened,	and	which	was	hitherto	filled	by	the	Five	Star	Movement,	would	begin	to	open	again.	For	this	party	would
have	effectively	abandoned	the	message	that	underpinned	its	spectacular	rise:	but	the	widespread	aspiration	for
‘cleaner’	politics,	and	for	a	fairer	and	more	efficient	equilibrium,	would	not	vanish,	and	might	well	stimulate	the
emergence	of	better	political	alternatives.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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